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ERNEST BARKER: SOCIAL CONTRACT 
INTRODUCTION, SECTION III, ON ROUSSEAU 
STUDY GUIDE 2012 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What disqualified Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a philosopher?  To say that Rousseau was an à 
 priori theorist (as to an à posteriori thinker) means that he started with his mind and imagination 
  rather than physical or empirical (experiential) evidence.  The Abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed a 
  European Union, along with a graduated income tax, free public  education for girls and boys, an 
  international court, and a constitutional monarchy.  What was the School of Natural Law 
  (associated with Burlamaqui and Vattel).  What was Rousseau’s attitude toward it?  (xxvii-xxx) 
 
2. What is Rousseau’s concept of the sovereign as a “moral person”?   His concept of the general 
  will?  The Latin phrases appear to refer to “everyone as all together” (as in Rousseau’s general 
  will) and “everyone as each one plural” (as in Rousseau’s will of all).  See question 4c) below. 
  Given Rousseau’s ambivalence, Barker sees Rousseau going beyond the usual natural law 
  thought.   
 
NOTE: Barker wrote this shortly after the end of WWII when the terrible toll of German Idealism 
(and the Historical School of Law) was so much more evident.  What Barker means to say is 
  that a tribal Folk-spirit or race-consciousness—along with a sense of the historical validity, even 
  inevitability, of its tribal legal tradition—had actually been substituted for the universal norms 
  associated with Enlightenment rationalism.  Barker is correct as far as he goes, but the deeper 
problem (as Marcello Pera appears to understand) is that both (French and English) 
Enlightenment rationalism and (German) Romantic-Transcendentalist historicism (such as 
Hegel’s Transcendental Idealism) are departures from an original Christian culture that had been 
riven by political and theological disputes.   All the same, Barker’s analysis of the totalitarian 
character of Rousseau’s thinking is largely convincing.  (xxx-xxxi) 
 
3. How does Barker compare and contrast the Discourse on Inequality with the later Social 
 Contract, particularly with regard to individualism and collectivism?  At the bottom of page xxxi is 
 a reference to the first modern human rights document: The Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
  Citizen, which Thomas Jefferson had a hand in shaping.  What made Rousseau less an influence 
  on rationalist France than the romantic-historicist Germany of Fichte and Hegel?  What Barker 
  calls the praeparatio evangelii Hegeliani means the preparation for the Hegelian gospel.  (xxxi- 
xxxii) 
 
4. What are the three propositions Barker advances about the Social Contract?  a) How is 
  Rousseau’s ambivalence and ambiguity evident with his view that the true State is a progressive 
  Force but that a state may be irrational, perverted, or despotic?  b)  Like Locke, Rousseau objects 
  to patriarchy but where does Barker believe Rousseau went wrong with the social contract idea? 
    Barker, like Francis Lieber earlier, held that “the society of the nation is a given fact of historical 
 evolution.”  A state may be created by a contract, but not a national society.  c)  Rousseau’s idea 
  of the general will that cause the greatest confusion.  Rousseau’s idea of the legislator is 
  developed as a “leader-principle).  But what makes his ideas a double-edged sword?  The 
  rationalistic Napoleonic Code imposed from the top illustrates where this idea leads.  (xxxii-xxxiii) 
 
5. Rousseau’s social contract must be understood as the design for a small primary democracy, like 
  Athens, Sparta, Geneva, or perhaps a New England town meeting.  He rejects representative 
  government bur Barker indicates that Rousseau’s ideal is self-contradictory: a souverain fainéant 
  (a do-nothing sovereign).  What does he mean?  The reference is to the late Merovingian kings, 
les rois fainéants (do-nothing kings) whom Pepin the Short, the household manager (mayor of the 
palace, like the later shoguns of Japan), persuaded the pope to remove and install him as king, 
instead).  Pepin, by the way, was the son of the great hero Charles Martel (the Hammer) and 
father of Charlemagne, who was elevated by a later Pope to western emperor on Christmas 
morning in the year 800.  Thus began western Christendom.  (xxxiii-xxxiv) 
 
6. Barker proceeds to discuss Rousseau’s inventiveness with regard to his plans for Geneva, but he 
contends that the problem with Rousseau’s conception of the general will is in the translation.  
How is Rousseau like Hobbes in his thinking?  Unlike Hobbes?  What is Rousseau’s famous 
paradox?  What makes it a paralogism (false argument)?   How does Rousseau’s Leviathan 
differ from Hobbes’s?  What is the nature of government in such a sovereign community?  An 
analogy could be found in certain phases of the French Revolution, the chaos of the Paris 
Commune of 1871, and the early weeks of the Bolshevik takeover in 1917-1918 where lynch law 
and terror prevailed.  How does Rousseau differ from Locke with respect to the legislative 
powers?   Unlike Montesquieu, Rousseau dismissed the British system as absurd and feudal and 
wished for only a temporary executive commission.  (xxxiv-xxxvi) 
 
7. Identify two old lessons of politics.  The second of these was learned through the development of 
the English cabinet system, which was still in its infancy is Rousseau’s day.  What three great 
logical difficulties faced Rousseau as he sought to discover a truly general will?  Rousseau 
rejects parties because they sacrifice the general good?  But then, how can the general will be 
truly distinguished from the will of all?  The second difficulty arises due to the intellectual effort of 
sustained reflection and discussion that is required.  Rousseau’s Führerprinzip (what the Nazis 
called the “leader-principle”) is truly a “god of the machine” brought in to resolve a convoluted plot 
but it lacks any safeguards.  It is as if the playwright (let us call him “Rousseau”) walks onto the 
stage and personally ties together all the loose ends of the plot before the curtain falls.  Barker 
rightly considers Rousseau to be a totalitarian, which is especially evident when he says in the 
chapter on civil religion: Any man who, after acknowledging these articles of faith, proceeds to act 
as though he did not believe them, it is good to (or deserves to be) put to death (qu’il soit puni de 
mort).  Rousseau’s concept of civil religion is anti-Christian; his concept of political liberty 
overlooks civil and religious liberty.  The third difficulty relates to the governance of large entities.  
Two options are a movable metropolis (such as the moving imperial court of the Holy Roman 
Empire or the rotating executive of some trade unions) or federalism.  (xxxvi-xxxix) 
 
8. Barker concludes with a medieval saying about the variability of Biblical interpretation: 
 
“Hic liber est in quo sua quærit dogmata quisque,  
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua,” 
 
Which may be rendered in an English paraphrase:  
 
“Men ope this book, their favourite creed in mind;  
“Each seeks his own, and each his own doth find.” 
 
http://www.traditionalcatholic.net/Scripture/Encyclopedia/Exegesis.html 
 
 To paraphrase Lord Macaulay’s quip that the American constitution was all sail and no anchor, 
Barker finds Rousseau’s dogmas to be all extremes and no center; all brilliance and nothing but 
nonsense.  The Cam River, which empties in the sea, became a channel for ideas brought from 
across the sea and is best known for its university at Cambridge. 
 
Review 
 
à priori    Abbé de Saint-Pierre  School of Natural Law 
Emmerich de Vattel  vacillation over natural law sovereign 
moral person   general will   individualism 
collectivism   State as a progressive force society of the nation 
general will vs. will of all  Napoleon   parliamentary democracy 
a do-nothing soverereign (legislature) requires a mayor of the palace (a legislator like Pepin) 
Rousseau’s paradox and paralogism    problems with Rousseau’s Leviathan 
two old lessons of politics Rousseau’s logical difficulties Rousseau’s dogmas   
